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I. INTRODUCTION: A BLOCKBUSTER DECISION
On May 21, 2019, Judge Lucy Koh handed down her decision in
Federal Trade Commission v. Qualcomm,1 one of the most important—and devastatingly misguided—decisions in the annals of antitrust law. At stake in this litigation was the entire business model of
Qualcomm, which has long been acknowledged as one of the leaders in
5G technology, where it contains an extensive portfolio of patents and
pending patent applications, estimated to number about 140,000.2
The gist of the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) complaint was that
Qualcomm, virtually from its inception, engaged in a set of unilateral
monopolistic practices that allowed it to extract unreasonably high
rates for the combination of its patented technologies and the chipsets
that it supplies to original equipment manufacturers (OEMS), other
than Qualcomm competitors. I shall examine the key allegations in
the case, but it is critical at the outset to note the extensive nature of
the injunctive relief that Judge Koh awarded on a worldwide basis.3
She was relentless in her condemnation: “In combination, Qualcomm’s
licensing practices have strangled competition in the CDMA [code-division multiple access] and premium LTE [long-term evolution] modern chip markets for years, and harmed rivals, OEMs, and end
consumers in the process.”4 She concluded that, in light of the ongoing
nature of the Qualcomm violations, it was necessary to enter a sweeping injunction against the continuation of Qualcomm practices.5 The
1. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 17-CV-00220-LHK, 2019 WL 2206013
(N.D. Cal. May 21, 2019).
2. Id. at *3.
3. Id. at *15.
4. Id. at *130.
5. Id. at *135 (noting that the FTC “seeks and requests” the following injunctive
relief from the Court: “(1) Prohibit Qualcomm from conditioning the supply of
modem chips on a customer’s patent-license status; (2) Require Qualcomm to negotiate or renegotiate, as applicable, license terms with customers in good faith
under conditions free from the threat of lack of access to or discriminatory provision of modem chip supply or associated technical, software, or other support;
(3) Require Qualcomm to submit, as necessary, to arbitral or judicial dispute resolution to determine reasonable royalties and other license terms should a customer choose to pursue such resolution; (4) Require Qualcomm to make
exhaustive SEP licenses available to modem-chip suppliers on fair, reasonable,
and non-discriminatory terms and to submit, as necessary, to arbitral or judicial
dispute resolution to determine such terms; (5) Prohibit Qualcomm from discriminating or retaliating in any way against any modem-chip customer or modemchip supplier because of a dispute with Qualcomm over license terms or because
of a customer’s license status; (6) Prohibit Qualcomm from making payments or
providing other value contingent on a customer’s agreement to license terms;
(7) Prohibit Qualcomm from entering express or de facto exclusive-dealing agreements for the supply of modem chips; (8) Prohibit Qualcomm from interfering
with the ability of any customer to communicate with a government agency about
a potential law enforcement or regulatory matter; (9) Require Qualcomm to adhere to compliance and monitoring procedures and appropriate ‘fencing in’ provi-
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key elements of that relief were that Qualcomm had to (1) abandon its
“no license, no chips policy” and offer all of its chips to both its competitors and OEMs on “exhaustive” licenses (those in which Qualcomm
waives any effort to seek legal relief against any customer of its licensee) on fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory terms; (2) review the
terms of each of its license agreements with all of its customers to see
that they are issued on fair and reasonable terms; and (3) abstain
from entering into “express or de facto exclusive-dealing agreements”
with its customers.6
Judge Koh’s decision has received a rocky reception since its publication. On August 23, 2019, a unanimous panel of the Ninth Circuit
granted a stay of the order pending its resolution on appeal.7 That
decision applied traditional principles in order to reach three central
conclusions. First, the Ninth Circuit held that Qualcomm had raised
“serious questions” on the merits of the decision below. Second,
Qualcomm had demonstrated the likelihood of “irreparable harm” absent a stay, and third that the balance of equities pointed toward a
stay. The brief per curiam decision took issue with the two central
conclusions of the district court decision that Qualcomm (1) has an
antitrust duty to license its SEPs to rival chip suppliers, and (2) engaged in anticompetitive conduct by using its royalty rates to effectively impose a surcharge on competitive chips.8 On the first of these
questions, the Ninth Circuit found that the duty to deal was far more
limited than Judge Koh had concluded, so that in all but exceptional
circumstances any firm is free to choose the parties to whom it wishes
to sell and the prices on which those sales will take place. It also noted
that the standard antitrust case law does not support the proposition
that any party can engage in “monopoly leveraging” by the way in
which it prices goods and services in two markets—in this instance,
the market for chips and the independent market for Qualcomm technology that is sold separately from the chips. It also noted the unusual
situation where the Department of Justice had filed its own brief to
express its “stark disagreement” with the approach that the FTC had
taken in this case.9 I know of nothing in this case which would lead
the Ninth Circuit to reverse field when the briefing is completed, and I
now firmly expect that the decision of Judge Koh will be overturned on

6.
7.
8.
9.

sions, including but not limited to a potential firewall between patent licensing
and chip personnel; and (10) Impose any other relief that the Court finds necessary and appropriate to redress and prevent recurrence of Qualcomm’s
conduct.”).
Id.
Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 19-16122, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS
25326 (9th Cir. Aug. 23, 2019).
Id.
Id. at *6.
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this appeal. The remainder of this article, written before the interim
stay was granted offers my arguments in favor of that conclusion.
Indeed, the decree gave rise to a remarkable intergovernmental
dispute as the Department of Justice (DOJ), which has concurrent jurisdiction over antitrust matters, took the unprecedented step of filing
its own papers before Judge Koh and asked that she go easy on the
remedy stage of the case in the event that she found antitrust violations.10 The DOJ’s filing provoked a fierce response from the FTC and
its defenders, who branded the request as “untimely” and claimed that
it “misconstrues applicable law and the record”11 in what has to rank
as one of the most profound public disagreements on antitrust policy
between the FTC and DOJ.
Clearly the stakes in this decision are extraordinarily high both for
its impact on Qualcomm and the 5G market, as well as for the future
shape of antitrust law in the United States and across the globe. In
light of the case’s significance, it is important to review this decision in
some detail, taking care to examine it using the proper conceptual
framework for antitrust analysis. Antitrust law is a complex body of
law that looks at a bewildering set of business practices, some benign
and some not, in order to ferret out and stop various strategies of monopolization. The motivation for this approach is easy to spot.
The shift from a pure competitive regime to a monopoly regime always entails some element of social loss. The higher prices that are
charged by the monopolist are not simply a distributional gambit,
whereby the producer gains exactly the same amount of wealth that
consumers lose. Why anyone should care about a zero-sum transaction
is hard to see. Indeed, these distributional consequences are hard to
disentangle because antitrust litigation typically involves litigation
between different entities, both public and private, which makes it especially difficult to know how any given decision influences the wealth
of individuals who often have stakes in the multi-layered entities on
both sides of the dispute. To incur high administrative costs to rearrange the outcome of some zero-sum game is always a form of social
waste. Therefore, the reason why the antitrust law focuses on monopoly power is that the exercise leads in most cases to a negative-sum
game. The monopolist gains less than the consumers of that product
10. For a discussion of the intergovernmental dispute, see Claude Barfield, The Justice Department’s Unprecedented Intervention in the Federal Trade Commission
Case Against Qualcomm: Implications for 5G, AM. ENT. INST. (May 10, 2019),
https://www.aei.org/publication/the-justice-departments-unprecedented-interven
tion-in-the-federal-trade-commission-case-against-qualcomm-implications-for-5g/
[https://perma.unl.edu/WG7J-PKJB].
11. FTC Calls DOJ Statement in Qualcomm Antitrust Case “Untimely,” Says it “Misconstrues Applicable Law and the Record”: Inter-Institutional Quarrel, FOSS PATENTS (May 10, 2019), http://www.fosspatents.com/2019/05/ftc-calls-doj-statementin-qualcomm.html [https://perma.unl.edu/KAS4-NQ6F].
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or service lose. The higher price exceeds the reservation price of at
least some consumers, so as some consumers drop out of the market,
fewer gainful transactions are completed.
There is one important correlative of the above analysis: the disastrous social consequences of mistakenly finding an antitrust violation
from the practice of procompetitive strategies by firms that have a
competitive advantage based on superior technology, better marketing, more astute management, or any combination of the above. This
pattern is evident in the FTC case against Qualcomm, which relies on
a novel monopolization theory that has little precedent in earlier case
law on the subject. When this Article was first prepared, Qualcomm
was fighting a two-front war. The first front was the FTC prosecution
of the matter before Judge Koh. At the same time, a complicated second front started with a systematic attack by Apple, now settled,
which had initiated its own antitrust litigation against Qualcomm as
part of an ongoing dispute over the patent royalties that Apple owed
Qualcomm.12 Qualcomm also sued Apple for its misuse of Qualcomm
trade secrets, which were alleged to have been shared improperly with
Intel in order to allow Intel to build its own 5G chips to power the next
generation of Apple smart devices.13 That was a spirited battle of titans until the case was settled suddenly and dramatically in April
2019, when Apple and Qualcomm dropped all claims against each
other.14
The terms of the settlement called for all litigation to cease between the two companies. In addition, Apple renewed its license for a
six-year licensing agreement by which Apple will power its new line of
iPhones with Qualcomm chips, reversing its 2016 decision to obtain
chips exclusively from Intel.15 It also appears that Apple will pay
Qualcomm somewhere between 4.5 and 4.7 billion dollars for past roy12. Jacob Kastrenakes, Apple and Qualcomm Drop All Lawsuits in Surprise Settlement, THE VERGE (Apr. 16, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019/4/16/18410985/
apple-qualcomm-settle-royalty-dispute-patent-licensing-terms-high-fees [https://
perma.unl.edu/FK4J-NM8X].
13. See Complaint, Qualcomm Inc. v. Apple Inc., No. 37-2017-00041389-CU-BC-NC
(Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 24, 2018). The relevant information is available at
Qualcomm Inc. v. Apple Inc., TRADE SECRETS INST. (June 30, 2019, 4:53 PM),
http://tsi.brooklaw.edu/cases/qualcomm-inc-v-apple-inc [https://perma.unl.edu/
GT5F-TCGA].
14. For the public announcement of their settlement, see Qualcomm and Apple Agree
to Drop All Litigation, BUS. WIRE (Apr. 16, 2019), https://www.businesswire.com/
news/home/20190416005931/en/ [https://perma.unl.edu/8KBT-5CRF].
15. See Jean Baptiste Su, Analysis: Apple to Drop Qualcomm Modems From Next
iPhones for Intel, Samsung Wireless Chips, FORBES (July 26, 2018, 12:39 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeanbaptiste/2018/07/26/analysis-apple-to-dropqualcomm-modems-from-next-iphones-for-intel-samsung-chips/#3d9e06fc4960
[https://perma.unl.edu/5W7L-NP3S].
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alties.16 Within hours after this settlement was announced, Intel exited the 5G market amid rumors that it would be unable to meet its
development goals in that space.17 The simplest explanation for all of
these events is that Qualcomm’s dominance in the advanced chip market was attributable to the excellence of its product, and not to the
marketing practices that the FTC claims violate the antitrust laws.
The Apple–Qualcomm settlement offers further confirmation that the
FTC’s suit was misconceived from the outset. Judge Koh did not allude to the Qualcomm–Apple settlement in her opinion,18 but substantial evidence appears to support the view that Apple returned to
Qualcomm because of the superiority of Qualcomm chips.19
Accordingly, it is still important to offer a detailed analysis of the
basic FTC case. To see how the matter plays out, this Article is organized in the following fashion. Part II describes the three different varieties of antitrust cases. The first are cases which deal with per se
offenses, in which only narrow and specific justifications for certain
practices are allowed in cartel-like situations where parties jointly
limit output or divide territories. The second class of cases are “rule of
reason” cases, where it is necessary to look closely at particular arrangements to see whether their restrictive consequences outweigh
their efficiency gains. The third class involves cases of per se legality,
where there is no antitrust duty at all, most notably in cases where
the claim is that the antitrust law imposes a duty on one firm to deal
with another. Once this typology is examined, in Part III I apply the
scheme to the allegations in the FTC complaint against Qualcomm,
which the government treats as a per se monopolization offense, but
which is better regarded as either a rule of reason case or a case involving no antitrust duty at all. The consequences of the FTC’s misclassification of its case against Qualcomm is serious in that it tends
16. For a brief account of the supposed settlement terms, see Qualcomm Got $4.7
Billion from Apple Settlement According to Earnings Release, MACRUMORS (May
1, 2019, 1:29 PM), https://www.macrumors.com/2019/05/01/qualcomm-apple-set
tlement-4-billion/ [https://perma.unl.edu/7Y49-8CL9].
17. Chaim Gartenberg, Intel Says Apple and Qualcomm’s Surprise Settlement
Pushed it to Exit Mobile 5G, THE VERGE (Apr. 25, 2019, 6:39 PM), https://www.the
verge.com/2019/4/25/18516830/intel-apple-qualcomm-surprise-settlementpushed-exit-mobile-5g-modems [https://perma.unl.edu/SM5W-QT3R].
18. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 17-CV-00220-LHK, 2019 WL
2206013, at *50–64 (N.D. Cal. May 21, 2019) (analyzing from 2007 to 2017, but
not beyond that date).
19. See Kif Leswing, Apple Reportedly Looked at Buying Intel’s 5G Business, Showing
Openness to Big Deals, CNBC (Apr. 26, 2019, 3:27 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/
2019/04/26/apple-looked-at-intels-5g-business-wsj.html [https://perma.unl.edu/
6VX-T4H7] (“Intel currently provides LTE modem chips for Apple’s current generation of iPhones. But Qualcomm’s modem chips are widely considered to be
superior, and Apple said it will buy Qualcomm chips again after a bitter legal
battle between the two companies was settled last week.”).
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to suppress the competition and innovation that the antitrust laws are
supposed to advance.
II. THE TYPOLOGY OF ANTITRUST OFFENSES
A.

Per Se Offenses

The conditions under which per se offenses are likely to happen are
generally well understood. The major threat in these cases is some
kind of a horizontal arrangement whereby rival suppliers band together to reduce output or divide territories in order to gain those precious monopoly rents. The social losses in these cases are easy to
detect, so that the prohibition is easy to state, even if the horizontal
arrangements are in some cases difficult to detect. Accordingly, the
main challenge in these cartelization cases lies in figuring out the best
set of remedies, both public and private, to stymie those threats.
The somewhat harder cases involve situations where two or more
firms decide to merge or otherwise combine their operation, which
could have the same consequences of reducing output and raising
prices. But in these cases the added complication is that some mergers
have only modest influence on prices or output while introducing certain joint efficiencies so that the fewer number of firms can actually
produce offsetting gains for consumers.20 In these cases, the positive
and negatives are both present, but they are often hard to balance out.
Hence the law adopts an intermediate strategy; the so-called rule is a
rule of reason which tries, with difficulty, to make some assessment of
the relevant magnitude of the gains or losses, and in most cases does
little to resist mergers that leave four, perhaps even three, major
firms in the marketplace.
B.

Rule of Reason Cases

A second portion of the antitrust docket deals with some kind of
vertical arrangement whose terms are fully stated on the record—concealment is not an issue. The legal game is now a form of doubledummy bridge, and the legal challenge here is to find out whether the
anti-monopolization rationale applies to these cases. The initial problem in these vertical situations is that there is no strong theory of how
the actions of any single party can proactively manipulate its prices or
terms in ways that impose monopoly losses on anyone else. It is therefore necessary to look hard at these cases before finding any antitrust
violation.
The first part of the problem is that all the actions of single parties
that result in the acquisition of some degree of monopoly do not make
20. Oliver Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Trade Offs,
58 AM. ECON. REV. 18 (1968).
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out the case for government intervention. The standard formulation,
which raises as many problems as it answers, is the key holding in
United States v. Grinnell Corp,21 which states that the government
can only make out a monopolization case by showing: “(1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth
or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.” There are difficulties defining the relative
market, and the best guideline is still that which comes out of the DOJ
and the FTC in their 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, neither cited
nor discussed by Judge Koh. The DOJ and FTC made the following
observation: “Market definition focuses solely on demand substitution
factors, i.e., on customers’ ability and willingness to substitute away
from one product to another in response to a price increase or a corresponding non-price change such as a reduction in product quality or
service.”22 To measure that degree of substitutability, the DOJ and
FTC rightly stress that the product market cannot be defined either
too broadly or too narrowly. Thus, in examining a merger between two
motorcycle companies, they caution against defining the market so
broadly that it includes cars, given the obvious dilution that it would
pose to the respective market shares of the two merger applicants. By
the same token, they recognize that the market cannot be defined too
narrowly, such that there is one market for large motorcycles and another one for small motorcycles. At this point, no merger could be attacked if two competitive firms are placed into distinct, adjacent
markets, even though there is substantial demand and
substitutability.
This analysis applies to liability on monopolization claims under
Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act (the Sherman Act), and the
parallel provisions dealing with monopolization under Section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act (the FTC Act), with its general injunction against “unfair methods of competition,” both of which were invoked by Judge Koh in her opinion.23 Indeed on August 13, 2015, the
FTC issued a one page statement of principle that stressed that the
unfair methods of competition under Section 5 should be tested
against a general standard of consumer welfare that requires, in essence, that the FTC only bring enforcement actions in cases where it
could identify conduct likely to cause “harm to competition or the competitive process, taking into account any associated cognizable effi-

21. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966).
22. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES
(2010).
23. Qualcomm, 2019 WL 2206013, at *13.
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ciencies and business justifications.”24 The lone dissenter of that
statement was then-Commissioner Maureen Ohlhausen, who was concerned that the proposed policy did not go far enough to rein in potential abuse by the FTC.25
There are, if anything, even greater difficulties in making out the
sharp dichotomy between the legal and illegal methods of monopoly
acquisition or maintenance. The case that is most protected is one in
which a firm succeeds through internal growth without gaining assets
through any kind of merger. But the converse is hardly true because
there are many sensible acquisitions that improve efficiency without
allowing any firm to impose restrictive practices on the market. And
where the course of business can last for many years, it is expected
that in many cases product excellence may be augmented in some uncertain proportion by some restrictive practice.
It is widely understood, for example, that a patent’s key function is
to give the patent holder the exclusive right to sell the good in question
during the patent period. Notably, the patent law contains the notion
of a “pioneer patent,” nowhere discussed by Judge Koh, which gives a
broad scope of application to patents that introduce transformative
technologies.26 No matter how broadly a patent is construed, the
grant of a patent does not necessarily allow the patent holder to market its goods in that period. Outside the patent, other impediments
against sale, such as the failure to obtain approval from the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA), could block the patented activity and
lead to necessary extensions in the protected period, such as those
under the Hatch-Waxman Act.27 Within the antitrust framework, Jefferson Parish Hospital Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde28 and its progeny have held
exclusive dealing and tie-in cases—both of which presuppose a defen24. FTC Issues Statement of Principles Regarding Enforcement of FTC Act as a Competition Statute, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Aug. 13, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2015/08/ftc-issues-statement-principles-regarding-enforce
ment-ftc-act [https://perma.unl.edu/ZX9A-S5JF] [hereinafter FTC Issues
Statement].
25. Fed. Trade Comm’n, Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Maureen K.
Ohlhausen, FTC Act Section 5 Policy Statement (Aug. 13, 2015).
26. For the simplest statement on this point, see Pioneer Patent Law and Legal Definition, USLEGAL, https://definitions.uslegal.com/p/pioneer-patent/ [https://perma
.unl.edu/V6HT-ZDWY] (“Pioneer patent refers to a patent that covers a function
or a major technological advance never before performed . . . Under the U.S. law,
the claims relating to a pioneer patent are entitled to broader interpretation and
therefore, should be given a broader range of equivalents.”). The last phrase refers to the doctrine of equivalents, which allows a patentee to sue for infringement, a device not explicitly covered by the patent. For discussion, see WarnerJenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
27. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98417, 98 Stat. 1585.
28. Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984). The case is not cited
or discussed by Judge Koh.
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dant with a dominant market position—are subject to a rule of reason
and not to per se invalidation. The logic of these cases is unexceptional. There are many cases in which tie-arrangements made perfectly good economic sense, so that the per se rule of illegality results
in too many false positives under the antitrust law. In this regard it is
critical to give the correct definition of the relevant market, noting the
basic point that patentees are allowed and encouraged to use their
monopoly power.
C.

Per Se Legality or “No-Duty” Rules

Modern antitrust law has established a strong safe harbor of per se
legality against the claim of illegal techniques toward monopolization.
This line of cases, led by Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, holds that no supplier of any product is under an
antitrust duty to license its products to anyone else, let alone a patent
infringer, outside of exceptional circumstances.29
III. FTC V. QUALCOMM
A.

The Complaint and the Ohlhausen Dissent

The most striking feature about the current litigation is that
neither the FTC nor Judge Koh relies on any known theory of vertical
or horizontal arrangements. Instead, they ignore the established case
law by assembling odd bits and pieces from some major cases, which,
if read in full support the opposite conclusion, or they ignore adverse
cases like Trinko altogether. The result is a flawed monopolization
claim that vastly overstates the power that Qualcomm possesses in
the relevant market, and brings back the specter that haunted the
antitrust laws of the 1960s: over-enforcement. At stake in this case is
international dominance in the 5G market, which is now getting close
to realization. Therefore, the issues take place on a far wider canvas
than those involved in the earlier litigation. It is, as Adam Mossoff
noted, a fitting irony that the FTC called as its lead witness a Huawei
economist, who works for one of Qualcomm’s major international competitors, while it is under investigation for stealing American trade
secrets.30
29. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398
(2004).
30. Adam Mossoff, The FTC Joins Huawei on a Misguided Troll Hunt, WALL ST. J.:
OPINION (Jan. 28, 2019, 4:24 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-ftc-joinshuawei-on-a-misguided-troll-hunt-11548624270 [https://perma.unl.edu/8TSGWQ27]. For the opposite view, see Theodore Olson, FTC Has Qualcomm’s Number, WALL ST. J.: OPINION (Jan. 29, 2019, 7:46 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
ftc-has-qualcomms-number-11548722793 [https://perma.unl.edu/6SXR-L7M8].
Olson, who represented Apple, endorsed the FTC’s monopolization claims based
on its “no license, no chips policy.” That general claim is examined later.
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The gist of the FTC’s claim is that Qualcomm engaged in unfair
methods of competition by using its alleged dominance in the chipsets
market to extract elevated royalties from all licensees of its patented
technology under standard FRAND (fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory) licenses. Lest there be any confusion, the key passage from
the FTC complaint reads as follows:
Qualcomm’s “no license-no chips” policy dramatically increases customers’
costs of challenging Qualcomm’s preferred license terms before a court or
other neutral arbiter—including on the basis that those terms are nonFRAND—or to negotiate royalties in the shadow of such a challenge. This
leaves Qualcomm’s customers in a markedly different position than they
would be in a typical patent licensing negotiation. As a result, Qualcomm’s
customers have accepted elevated royalties and other license terms that do
not reflect an assessment of terms that a court or other neutral arbiter would
determine to be fair and reasonable.31

In essence, the FTC claims that Qualcomm, by unilateral action
alone, is able to impose an unprecedented and hidden “tax” on all of
Qualcomm’s rivals who need a Qualcomm license to market their own
chips, including the CDMA and the premium LTE technology, where
Qualcomm allegedly holds a dominant position in the marketplace.
The gist of the FTC theory is that Qualcomm can charge all of its customers an elevated royalty for its chipset licenses. The key strategy
that the FTC claims facilitates this outcome has always been in plain
view. Qualcomm has long announced a policy of “no license-no chips”
for its products. Qualcomm has insisted that any firm that wishes to
acquire its chips must obtain a license from Qualcomm for intellectual
property rights (IPRs) related to its patented technologies enabling 3G
and 4G communication systems. The same system will, of course, also
apply to the 5G chips and technology.
The FTC has challenged this stated policy on the ground that it
enables Qualcomm, by unilateral action alone, to acquire undeserved
monopoly profits for chipsets by forcing its chipset buyers to pay excessive royalties to license its FRAND-encumbered patents.32 According to the FTC, that extra license fee operates as an implicit “tax” from
all of Qualcomm’s customers who needed Qualcomm’s cutting-edge
CDMA chips for their phones—chips where Qualcomm allegedly held
a dominant position in the marketplace. The whole point is something
of a mystery, for the FTC never explains why Qualcomm could not just
raise the price of its chips to extract the supposed monopoly profit, of
which it gives no direct evidence. Nor does it explain how the monopoly mechanism works. The license did not obligate them to use
31. Federal Trade Commission’s Complaint for Equitable Relief, Fed. Trade Comm’n
v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 5:17-CV-00220, 2017 WL 242848 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2017).
32. FRAND refers to “fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory rates,” which is a public utility-like standard that parties agree to whenever they license their “standard essential patents,” which are incorporated into a basic standard.
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Qualcomm chips or chipsets (together “chips”), for if they needed chips
at all, they were free to acquire other chips from other vendors of their
own choosing. The fact that some parties would want the technology
without purchasing the chips explains why there has to be separate
pricing for the two elements. Yet that efficiency is neither mentioned
nor refuted in either the FTC’s complaint or Judge Koh’s decision.
The FTC complaint was met by this stinging dissent of Commissioner Maureen K. Ohlhausen:
The core theory of the complaint is that Qualcomm uses its alleged chipset
monopoly to force its customers—smartphone manufacturers (OEMs)—to pay
unreasonably high royalties to license FRAND-encumbered patents that are
essential to practicing CDMA and LTE cellular-communications standards.
Because OEMs have to pay those royalties regardless of which chipset manufacturers they purchase from, the alleged effect is to squeeze the margins of
Qualcomm’s competitors in chipsets. Qualcomm allegedly implements that
strategy through its “no license–no chips” policy and refusal to license its chipset-maker rivals. The fundamental element of this theory is a royalty overcharge. If Qualcomm charges reasonable royalties for its patents, then there is
no anticompetitive “tax”—the complaint’s nomenclature for a price squeeze—
but only the procompetitive monetization of legitimate patent rights. Importantly, there is no suggestion that Qualcomm charges higher royalties to
OEMs that buy non-Qualcomm chipsets. Hence, the complaint’s taxation theory requires that Qualcomm charge OEMs unreasonably high royalties.
Rather than allege that Qualcomm charges above-FRAND royalties, the complaint dances around that essential element. It alleges that Qualcomm’s practices disrupt license challenges and bargaining in the shadow of law, and that
the ensuing royalties are “elevated.” But the complaint fails to allege that
Qualcomm charges more than a reasonable royalty.33

Commissioner Ohlenhausen’s last paragraph is critical, for there
are only two states of the world. In the first, the royalties are within
FRAND, at which point there is no possible exaction. In the alternative, there is a violation of the FRAND terms, but in this instance
under Trinko, the sole remedy is for breach of contract. No firm is required under the antitrust law to enter into these FRAND arrangements under the principles of Trinko, and joining a FRAND
agreement does not trigger any new antitrust violations. As Assistant
Attorney General for Antitrust Makan Delrahim has stated, “An antitrust cause of action premised on a failure to abide by FRAND commitments would be inconsistent with Section 2 of the Sherman Act.”34
33. U.S. Fed. Trade Comm’n, No. 141-0199, Dissenting Statement of Commissioner
Maureen K. Ohlhausen, In the Matter of Qualcomm, Inc. (Jan. 17, 2017), https://
www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/170117qualcomm_mko_dissenting_
statement_17-1-17a.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/T6MZ-DWK9].
34. Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dept. of Justice, Remarks as Prepared for IAM’s Patent Licensing Conference: Antitrust Law and
Patent Licensing in the New Wild West (Sept. 18, 2018). Absent an antitrust duty
to deal, a company has no obligation to deal under terms and conditions favorable
to its competitors.
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The Monopolization Issue

Faced with this dilemma, the FTC makes, and Judge Koh, endorses, the woolly claim that conduct may be “an unfair method of
competition if it is ‘collusive, coercive, predatory or exclusionary in
character’” or possesses other indicia of oppressiveness,35 and further
that “standards for determining whether it is ‘unfair’ within the
meaning of § 5 [of the FTC Act] must be formulated to discriminate
between normally acceptable business behavior and conduct that is
unreasonable or unacceptable.”36 That standard was quoted from E.I.
Du Pont De Nemours & Co v. FTC.37 But Judge Koh does not quote
the follow-on sentence from Du Pont, which casts the passage in the
exact opposite light: “Otherwise the door would be open to arbitrary or
capricious administration of § 5; the FTC could, whenever it believed
that an industry was not achieving its maximum competitive potential, ban certain practices in the hope that its action would ‘increase
competition.’”38 The entire decision in Du Pont was a warning against
the aggressive application of Section Five of the FTC Act, which points
to the exact opposite result that she reached here. The basic fact pattern in Du Pont arose when the FTC charged that Du Pont and other
major antiknock compound manufacturers “engaged in unfair methods of competition in violation of § 5(a)(1) when . . . each firm independently and unilaterally adopted at different times [certain] business
practices that were neither restrictive, predatory, nor adopted for the
purpose of restraining competition.”39
The case is therefore instantly distinguishable from the FTC
against Qualcomm on several grounds. First, it alleged some form of
cooperative behavior among rival sellers, while the case against
Qualcomm is for unilateral actions. Second, to the extent that Du Pont
involved patents, it reached the opposite conclusion from Judge Koh
when it stated:
[I]f anticompetitive impact were the sole test, the admittedly lawful unilateral
closing of a plant or refusal to expand capacity could be found to be “unfair.”
The holder of a valid product patent could be prevented from exercising its
lawful monopoly to charge whatever the traffic would bear, even though “a
monopolist, as long as he has no purpose to restrain competition or to enhance
or expand his monopoly, and does not act coercively, retains [the right to trade
with whom he wishes].”40
35. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 17-CV-00220-LHK, 2019 WL
2206013, at *13 (N.D. Cal. May 21, 2019).
36. Id. at *11.
37. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 729 F.2d 128, 138 (2d Cir.
1984).
38. Id. at 138–39.
39. Id. at 130.
40. Id. at 138 (citation omitted).
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Finally, Judge Koh never noted that the Second Circuit had rejected
an FTC order on the further grounds that the FTC “owes a duty to
define the conditions under which conduct claimed to facilitate price
uniformity [the issue in that case] would be unfair so that businesses
will have an inkling as to what they can lawfully do rather than be left
in a state of complete unpredictability.”41
It is therefore an unpardonable act of cherry-picking quotations by
both the FTC and Judge Koh to take a precedent that is foursquare
against them and treat it as a foundation for their analysis. Their argument is even worse because it is painfully clear that none of the first
four terms apply to this case, unless one wants to take the bizarre
position that every effort by every firm to increase its royalty rates is a
form of coercion, at which point no supplier can escape the threat of
antitrust liability, just as the court in Du Pont feared. Nor by this extended logic is there any way in which a licensee, such as Apple, could
escape the charge that its determined efforts to obtain lower rates is a
form of coercion against potential sellers that render it subject to antitrust liability. It simply makes no sense to define coercion so broadly
such that all market participants are at perpetual risk of the charge.
Any workable definition has to be narrow enough to allow for the ordinary give-and-take that is part and parcel of any business negotiation.
Nonetheless, neither the FTC nor Judge Koh offer any limiting conditions on the theory of liability.
The FTC and Judge Koh seek to create a wedge between these two
statutes by insisting that in dealing with Section 5 it is sufficient for
the government to show that the allegedly anticompetitive actions
“reasonably appear capable of making a significant contribution to
maintaining monopoly power.”42 But that standard is hopelessly lax,
for under that test, conduct that most likely will not constitute an antitrust violation nonetheless remains vulnerable to antitrust action,
thereby posing a serious risk of FTC over-enforcement. Elsewhere the
FTC contends, and Judge Koh accepts, that injunctive relief is appropriate where there is some “cognizable danger of a recurrent violation,”43 which again sets the bar far too low. In so doing, both the FTC
and Judge Koh disregard the FTC’s one page August 2015 statement
(referred to above) that stressed that the unfair methods of competition under Section 5 should be tested against a standard of consumer
welfare used generally under the Sherman Act to identify conduct
likely to cause “harm to competition or the competitive process, taking

41. Id. at 139.
42. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 17-CV-00220-LHK, 2019 WL 2206013
at *25 (N.D. Cal. May 21, 2019).
43. Id. at *130.
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into account any associated cognizable efficiencies and business
justifications.”44
Stated otherwise, the gist of the FTC theory, accepted by Judge
Koh, is that Qualcomm can charge an elevated royalty for the licenses
of its patent portfolio, above what the FTC posits—but does not
demonstrate—to be the competitive licensing royalty rates. In the
FTC’s own words, “Qualcomm’s chip leverage in license negotiations
raises royalties.”45 Its asserted evidence for this proposition is that
“the dependence on Qualcomm for modem chip supply heavily influenced license negotiations and led to elevated effective royalties.”46
But those self-serving testimonials count for naught in the face of unambiguous evidence to the contrary. Remember the exit of Intel from
the 5G market is only explainable by the simple fact that it cannot
compete on price, timeliness, or quality.
In her decision, Judge Koh takes the aggressive position that a barrier to entry arises whenever the incumbent makes “onerous front-end
investments that might deter competition from all but the hardiest
and most financially secure investors.”47 She then uses that point to
explain the predicament of Intel without mentioning its withdrawal
from the 5G market for phone modems. Judge Koh quotes Intel’s thenChief Strategy Officer who stated that Qualcomm had a two decades
head start on Intel, which forced Intel to invest “lots of money, billions
of dollars, and an army of engineers” to generate a premium LTE
modem chip business from scratch.48 Yet the point is wholly incorrect;
within the antitrust law, it is best to think of a barrier to entry as
some formal legal obstacle—a regulation, tax, or permit—that is imposed on a subsequent entrant that the initial entrant did not face.
Treating the high cost of catching up by developing a rival technology
“from scratch” as a barrier to entry means that the initial entrant is
now forced by law to provide subsidies to its late-coming rivals. This
essentially introduces a regime of cross-subsidies that distorts the investment decisions of both early and subsequent players. In light of
the general rules on patent power articulated in cases such as Du
Pont, that entire position must be rejected.

44. FTC Issues Statement, supra note 24.
45. Federal Trade Commission’s Pretrial Brief at 10, Fed. Trade Comm’n v.
Qualcomm Inc., No. 17-CV-00220-LHK, 2019 WL 2206013 (N.D. Cal. May 21,
2019).
46. Id.
47. Qualcomm, 2019 WL 2206013, at *14 (quoting United States v. Microsoft Corp.,
253 F.3d 34, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).
48. Id. at *24.
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Market Definition

The analysis of patent power in the previous section is critical to
understanding the definition of the relevant market for antitrust enforcement. Everyone agrees that the market for Qualcomm’s technology and chips is worldwide, so the critical question is the definition of
the product market. In order to address this issue, Judge Koh relies on
a well-known test in antitrust law: “Under the hypothetical monopolist test, the court asks ‘whether a monopolist in the proposed market
could profitably impose a small but significant and non-transitory
price increase’ or ‘SSNIP.’ ”49 As noted earlier, the application of this
standard is far from easy given the difficulties of deciding whether the
test is too wide or too narrow. In this instance, Judge Koh thinks that
these difficulties do not matter because the dominance of the CDMA
chip is such that no technology is a close substitute.50 Unfortunately,
her analysis does not take into account the special position of patented
technology for which market exploitation—in order to encourage innovation—is prized and not disparaged. The simple response is that
meeting the SSNIP standard is the sign of a strong patent, not the
sign of an antitrust violation.
That point was implicit in Du Pont, and it is also worthwhile to
note how this insight was applied in Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc.51 There, the alleged tying good was subject to patent
protection which applies, as noted earlier, with special force to pioneer
patents. The holding of the case stated that the rule of reason standard should be applied in cases in which patented goods are alleged to
be the tying good, and that any supposed presumption that a patent
confers market power “must be supported by proof of power in the relevant market rather than by a mere presumption thereof.”52 The explanation for this approach is not hard to seek. The patent gives one
the exclusive right to sell a good in a given marketplace, but that
power alone does not exclude the possibility that other products covered by patents of their own are competing for the same market niche
for end users. The strength of any given patent is determined by the
number of close substitutes. The patents that have the most unique
niches can generate the greatest economic rents, which is all for the
good. At the front end, it spurs the technology for pioneer patents
whose customers happily pay a high price for a new technology that
leaves them better off than before. Simultaneously, at the back end,
those high rents signal to other potential entrants that moving into
49. Id. at *15 (quoting Theme Promotions, Inc. v. News Am. Mktg. FSI, 546 F.3d 991,
1002 (9th Cir. 2008)).
50. Id. at *15–16.
51. Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006). The case is not cited or
discussed by Judge Koh.
52. Id. at 43.
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this market promises, at least in the short-run, super competitive
profits.
D.

Trinko and the Antitrust Duty to Deal

In the next section of her opinion, Judge Koh states that
“Qualcomm Has an Antitrust Duty to License its SEPs to Rivals.”53
Her bland recitation of the holding from Trinko misses all of the relevant features, as she is content to write:
The United States Supreme Court has explained that, in general, “there is no
duty to aid competitors.” Trinko, 540 U.S. at 411. Nonetheless, “[u]nder certain circumstances, a refusal to cooperate with rivals can constitute anticompetitive conduct and violate § 2.” Id. For the reasons explained below, the
Court concludes that Qualcomm has an antitrust duty to license its SEPs to
rival modem chip suppliers.54

This characterization sanitizes Trinko so that it now stands for the
exact opposite proposition that Justice Scalia advocated. His fuller
passage reads: “[w]e have been very cautious in recognizing such exceptions, because of the uncertain virtue of forced sharing and the difficulty of identifying and remedying anticompetitive conduct by a
single firm.”55 Judge Koh casts caution to the winds, and thus reads
the exception to Trinko as if it swallowed the rule. Thus, the most
noted exception to the Trinko rule is the much criticized decision56 of
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.57 That case held
that the decision of the three defendants to expel the plaintiff could
constitute an antitrust violation for three ski resorts, which previously
offered package deals with a fourth, to break off that arrangement.
The decision is instantly distinguishable on the grounds that Justice
Scalia cited for the no-duty rule. Aspen Skiing did not involve the creation of any forced associations with competitors with whom the defendants had not previously done business.58 Judge Koh’s effort to
shoehorn Qualcomm into the Aspen Skiing strategy provoked an angry and effective response by a new Commissioner of the FTC, Christine Wilson:
Here, the judge concluded that Qualcomm had a duty to license its intellectual
property to chip-making rivals, even though Qualcomm did not have a preexisting, voluntary and profitable course of dealing with them. So she expanded the scope of Aspen Skiing. Peering into the distant past, she found
that in 1999 Qualcomm said it was licensing some patents to some chip mak53. Qualcomm, 2019 WL 2206013, at *81.
54. Id.
55. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408
(2004).
56. See Dennis W. Carlton, A General Analysis of Exclusionary Conduct and Refusal
to Deal—Why Aspen and Kodak are Misguided, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 659 (2001).
57. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
58. Id. at 603 (noting that the monopolist made an “important change” to a cooperative business practice that “had persisted for several years.”).
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ers. Although it has long since stopped, and presumably those patents have
long since expired, she reasoned that “Qualcomm itself has licensed its [patents] to rival” chip makers, and therefore had a duty under fcis]Aspen Skiing
to “continue” doing so. Never mind that the judge’s reference point involved
licensing different patents, to different competitors, in a different century. By
this logic, Aspen Skiing now means that if a company ever sells any product to
any competitor, it then could have a perpetual antitrust obligation to sell
every product to every competitor.59

As Commissioner Wilson points out, Judge Koh’s fanciful reading
of Aspen is light years beyond the “outer boundary” of antitrust law.
Instead, it only sought to reinstate an arrangement that had once
been in place. Additionally, it did not impose any of the enormous
ratemaking burdens that proved so troublesome in Trinko. Finally, it
is worth noting that under a rule of reason this case gives rise to a
serious efficiency justification for the conduct of the three ski resorts if
they could show that the quality of the lifts at the plaintiff resort was
inferior to the quality of their lifts. At that point the pooling arrangement (which helps bring people to the slopes) is offset by an efficiency
disadvantage. Each of the parties to the agreement share equally in
revenue, the greater portion of which is generated by the three
defendants.
Justice Koh never discusses these issues in her brief and unsatisfactory treatment of the case.60 Nor does she address the particulars
of the Trinko decision, which is a powerful precedent for Qualcomm in
this case. The 1996 Telecommunications Act61 radically changed the
situation on the ground. Congress imposed new duties on the incumbent “Local Exchange Carriers” (LECs)—those companies that had exclusive monopolies in territories by virtue of the settlement of the
1982 antitrust lawsuit that secured the break-up of AT&T. These
LECs had statutory duties to enter into interconnection agreements
with the so-called “Competitive Exchange Carriers” (CLECs). Under
these agreements, the LECs would grant the CLECs access to their
networks on a nondiscriminatory basis by supplying the CLECs with
what were termed unbundled network elements (UNEs).
The new entrants could acquire UNEs selectively in order to build
out their new network which allowed the CLEC to compete in the
LECs’ territory. This was a clear case of a statutory duty to subsidize a
competitor.62 The only way to implement this scheme was to allow the
59. Christine Wilson, A Court’s Dangerous Antitrust Overreach, WALL ST. J. (May 28,
2019, 7:10 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-courts-dangerous-antitrust-over
reach-11559085055 [https://perma.unl.edu/6JKV-9VPT].
60. Qualcomm, 2019 WL 2206013, at *81–85.
61. The Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). For a discussion of the scope of the
sharing obligation, see AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999).
62. 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3) (2012) (establishing “[t]he duty to provide, to any requesting
telecommunications carrier for the provision of a telecommunications service,
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Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the various state
rate commissions to prescribe the terms under which the LECs had to
pair with the multiple CLECs that wanted to enter into their territory. In effect, these were forced commercial interactions imposed by
statute. The purpose of this scheme was certainly fully congruent with
the antitrust laws in so far as it uprooted the LECs’ local monopolies
by imposing sharing obligations on the LECs.63 But, there were difficulties in the enforcement of this obligation, and Verizon was held in
violation of its statutory obligations.
The question then arose whether the violation of the Telecommunications Act counted as a violation of the antitrust laws as well. The
statutory framework contained two key provisions. The Telecommunications Act was not allowed to preempt the operation of the antitrust
laws: “[n]othing in this Act or the amendments made by this Act shall
be construed to modify, impair, or supersede the applicability of any of
the antitrust laws.”64 By the same token, the status quo was preserved because the Telecommunications Act also did nothing to expand the scope of the antitrust laws. It did not create new claims going
beyond existing antitrust standards. The creation of any additional
antitrust standards would be equally inconsistent with the saving
clause’s mandate that nothing in the Telecommunications Act would
“modify, impair, or supersede the applicability” of existing law.
The antitrust laws thus carried over. Trinko’s claim sought to piggyback on the FCC’s resolution of the statutory grievance by initiating
an antitrust action that concerned the same territory based on the
same theory.65 Judge Koh thus wholly misread Trinko by imposing on
Qualcomm an unprecedented duty to deal with its competitors.66 In
the bluntest form, the antitrust law is concerned with ensuring the
maintenance of competition between rivals. Therefore, it cannot require what no competitive market would allow, namely, for one business to be forced to supply its competitors. Since these sales are
compelled by the state, the price has to be set by the state, because by

63.
64.
65.
66.

nondiscriminatory access to network elements on an unbundled basis at any
technically feasible point on rates, terms, and conditions that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory in accordance with the terms and conditions of the
agreement and the requirements of this section and section 252. An incumbent
local exchange carrier shall provide such unbundled network elements in a manner that allows requesting carriers to combine such elements in order to provide
such telecommunications service.”).
For a discussion of the scheme, see Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Fed. Commc’ns
Comm’n, 535 U.S. 467, 488 (2002).
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 143 (codified in
47 U.S.C. § 152).
Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
405–06 (2004).
See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 17-CV-00220-LHK, 2019 WL
2206013, at *81–85 (N.D. Cal. May 21, 2019).
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definition there is no price at which the holder of a given technology
finds itself better off by sharing that technology with a rival. Of
course, there are many cases in which such licenses, often part of complex cross-licensing transactions, do take place in the voluntary market. But it is precisely because markets often do work in these
situations that there is no need for the state to coerce any transaction.
The refusal to deal is rightly regarded as wrong when committed by
common carriers and public utilities. But even then, such duties have
always extended only to consumers, not to competitors.67 Indeed, the
standard rule has always been that one common carrier is not obligated to take at regulated rates the packages of another common carrier. Cross subsidies do not exist in competitive circumstances and
should not be imposed either by the antitrust laws or by any system
governing regulated industries.
E.

Qualcomm’s Pricing Policy—The Use of Constant Rates

In the next stage of her argument, Judge Koh manages to draw
precisely the wrong inference from the simple fact that since the
founding of Qualcomm in 1985, the rate for anyone to obtain a technology license has been constant, no matter what company supplied the
chips. The key testimony on which Judge Koh relies reads as follows:
Richard Donaldson, the FTC’s licensing expert, explained that Qualcomm’s
royalty rates should decline over time because handsets are now essentially
computers:
[I]n the case of Qualcomm when rates were first established back when
CDMA was used in telephones were our cell phones were [sic]—it was just
a cell phone. No other capabilities. And those products have changed dramatically over the life since then and we now have smartphones with
many, many features that do not infringe the cellular patents, the SEPs.
So I would expect that to drive a lower royalty rate.68

There is absolutely no reason to think that this point is relevant to
the question of whether Qualcomm exerted some form of monopoly
power. The relevant question is not whether Qualcomm had used the
same form of pricing over its entire existence, but instead, whether it
had to respond to competition from new entrants. In this instance,
competition from new entrants came from the Taiwanese company
MediaTek, whose successful efforts to erode Qualcomm’s dominance
led to an overall rate reduction from Qualcomm in order to keep market share.69 Nor does Judge Koh’s basic theory make any sense. The
67. For a discussion of the history of common carrier regulation, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, PRINCIPLES FOR A FREE SOCIETY: RECONCILING INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY WITH
THE COMMON GOOD 279 (1998).
68. Qualcomm, 2019 WL 2206013, at *103.
69. Ralph Jennings, MediaTek is Fighting Back Against Qualcomm to Speed Up
Cheap Smartphones in China, FORBES (July 30, 2018, 3:30 AM), https://www
.forbes.com/sites/ralphjennings/2018/07/30/mediatek-is-fighting-back-againstqualcomm-to-speed-up-cheap-smartphones-in-china/#531c03a4b478 [https://per
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conversion of a smart phone into a computer is neither here nor there.
If the industry structure has evolved from the cell phone to the smart
phone, so too did the various generations of Qualcomm’s patents. It is
simply naked speculation to assume that the new patent suite is more
valuable today than the older patent suite was in the cell phone era.
More or less concretely, the Donaldson testimony presupposes that
Qualcomm started with a monopoly power when Qualcomm first introduced its technologies, and when it made no chips at all, until the
present. In subsequent years, Qualcomm, unlike its competitors, took
on a dual role. It has continued to be a pioneer in systems technology,
to which it then added the role of chips producer. Some of those chips
obtained dominant market positions, others did not.
Nor is it permissible to overlook the plausible efficiency justifications for Qualcomm’s pricing policy. Its strict nondiscrimination policy
offered critical price protection for Qualcomm customers against potential holdups.70 At no time during its entire existence has
Qualcomm ever threatened to cut off its licensed technology to companies that refused to buy its chips. It has of course—as Judge Koh
notes—refused to supply chips to companies that have refused to license its technology. Thus, Judge Koh goes on at some length to describe instance after instance in which there was a refusal to deliver
chips to customers who would not take out a chip license.71 Nonetheless, she wrongly attributes antitrust implications to an indispensable
element of ordinary patent law, which, as noted in Du Pont, allows
any patentee unilaterally to set the terms and conditions on which it
does business.72 At all times, the pricing of these two distinct lines of
business was independent of the other, which makes it incorrect for
the FTC to assert that Qualcomm was able to secure supra-competitive profits by making firms “face the prospect of a modem-chip supply
disruption.”73 Indeed, Qualcomm is in a business that requires that it
maintain goodwill with its existing customer base in order for it to
acquire new customers. The use of a uniform pricing structure for licensing in all markets is, in fact, a strong guarantee against the risk
that any particular firm or product line will be targeted with threats,
which in any individual case would frighten Qualcomm’s customer
base. The FTC’s claim that the threat of chip disruption drives
Qualcomm’s ability to reap special short-term profits would, if such a

70.
71.
72.
73.

ma.unl.edu/7PXP-E77S] (noting the fierce back and forth competition between
the two companies).
Richard A. Epstein, F. Scott Kieff & Daniel F. Spulber, The FTC, IP, and SSOs:
Government Hold-Up Replacing Private Coordination, 8 J. COMPETITION L. &
ECON. 1 (2012).
Qualcomm, 2019 WL 2206013, at *8.
See E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 729 F.2d 128, 138 (2d
Cir. 1984).
Federal Trade Commission’s Pretrial Brief, supra note 45, at 12.
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policy was either announced or implemented, prove a public relations
disaster for the business.
It is also critical to note that from the founding of Qualcomm in
1985, the rate for obtaining a technology license has been constant no
matter what company supplied the chips. That rate applied when
Qualcomm first introduced its technologies—when it made no chips at
all—through the present. Qualcomm’s strict nondiscrimination policy
offers critical price protection for Qualcomm’s customers against any
possible holdout risk.74 Consistent with this analysis, at no time during its entire operations did Qualcomm ever threaten to cut off its licensed technology for companies that refused to buy its chips. At every
interval, the pricing of these two distinct lines of business was independent of the other, which makes it incorrect for the FTC to assert—
or for Judge Koh to conclude—that Qualcomm was able to secure
supra-competitive profits by making firms “face the prospect of a
modem-chip supply disruption.” The rates for licensing its technologies remained the same in all cases for all products, even as
Qualcomm’s share of the market started to drop in 2013.75 The supposed lever never moved.
The FTC then goes on to claim that Qualcomm, in aid of its ability
to collect that surcharge, used other devices to cement its monopolistic
position, including by making “payments of funds designed to induce
OEMs [original equipment manufacturers] to accept Qualcomm’s preferred royalty terms.”76 Judge Koh joins in the condemnation of these
rebate provisions on the ground that they were in effect an effort to
secure a “de facto exclusion” policy of the sort she banned. Yet, neither
the FTC nor Judge Koh explained why Qualcomm would pay others to
use its chips if Qualcomm had the kind of monopoly power that it allegedly possessed. Qualcomm should have been able to exact the
higher level of profits without having to pay some of that cash back to
secure the loyalty of its customers. In making its claim, the FTC ignores the best efficiency explanation for those incentive payments
when it claims that these payments to its licensees somehow increased
the price that Qualcomm extracted out of them. By making a front-end
payment to its customers, Qualcomm disarmed itself from any threat
of service disruption. Instead, it bound itself to serve its licensees in
the long run, as that was the only way in which it could recoup the
implicit bond that it created through the transfer payments.
At the same time, the FTC and Judge Koh ignore the opposite side
of the holdout risk in these FRAND negotiations. As Kayvan Noroozi
74. Epstein et al., supra note 70.
75. See Federal Trade Commission’s Opposition to Qualcomm’s Motion to Dismiss at
77, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 17-CV-00220-LHK, 2019 WL
2206013, at *12–13 (N.D. Cal. May 21, 2019).
76. Federal Trade Commission’s Pretrial Brief, supra note 45, at 1.
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and I have demonstrated, there is no a priori reason why a potential
buyer of chip sets or technology would not seek a reduced price below
that obtainable in a competitive market.77 Our proposal was skeptical
of any claim of holdout by a licensee-implementer unless it first made
its own concrete proposal as to how the patented technology should be
priced and why.
The key point here is that the holdout risk runs in both directions.78 It is also the case that any reduction in rates that works to the
benefit of downstream implementers also works to the disadvantage of
upstream producers. At one point, the FTC claims that eliminating
Qualcomm’s so-called “tax”—a term that Judge Koh studiously
avoids—removes an excess burden that is otherwise imposed on downstream parties, many of whom are innovators in their own fields. In so
doing, the FTC claims that Qualcomm’s behavior thus “diminishes
their ability and incentive to enter, expand, invest, and innovate.” But
that claim is ungrounded so long as Qualcomm operates within the
traditional boundaries of the FRAND license, and it is remedied by a
breach of contract action if Qualcomm acts outside of those permissible boundaries.
Either way, a complete analysis evaluates the impact of any pricing practice or policy on both upstream and downstream innovators,
knowing that any forced transfer from upstream to downstream has
both positive and negative effects, neither of which the FTC can quantify. It therefore cannot explain why the effort to remove one distortion in the downstream market does not create a greater distortion in
the upstream market. But the powerful inference is that there is no
distortion in any downstream market so long as patented technologies
are licensed at FRAND rates in a competitive chipset market. No one
would say that an innovative research firm like Apple should be able
to lease space at below market rates or hire workers at below market
rates in order to spur its innovation. Such a firm has no claim to be
subsidized by its suppliers or by its employees. Nor should that innovative firm be able to demand inappropriately low prices for the intellectual property or chipsets that it receives from upstream suppliers.
The FTC presented no evidence whatsoever of systematic price distortions at any level of the market, which is a prerequisite to establish
77. Richard A. Epstein & Kayvan B. Noroozi, Why Incentives for “Patent Holdout”
Threaten to Dismantle FRAND, and Why It Matters, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1381 (2017).
78. In general, for patent negotiations there are two distinct risks. First is the “patent holdup” risk, which suggests that entities like Qualcomm would try to extract
excessive royalties from the companies that implement their technology. Second
is the “patent holdout” risk, which suggests that the companies that Qualcomm
licenses its technologies to would refuse to negotiate in good faith and thus
ratchet up the costs of enforcing the innovator’s valid patent. See id. at 1384.
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an antitrust injury,79 that is, an “injury of the type the antitrust laws
were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants’ acts unlawful.”80 Judge Koh’s opinion does nothing to fill
this gap.
F.

The FTC Valuation Dilemma

Thus far I have addressed the legal deficiencies in the FTC complaint, but even if its theory of liability made sense, it offers no discussion of the appropriate remedy. And Judge Koh’s brief discussion of
this issue is wholly disproportionate to the enormous burdens that she
has imposed on Qualcomm. Once the FTC and Judge Koh reject the
current rates, they must establish a rate structure that makes sense
in light of the flawed monopolization theory they both champion.
Clearly the injunction must speak to the construction of nonmarketbased rates. But that entire enterprise is doomed to fail. The point
here is put well by Alex Galetovic and Stephen Haber:
Bottom up holds that courts should value SEPs [standard essential patents]
as the incremental value of the patented technology compared to its next-best
alternative (which was discarded) at the time that the SEP became part of an
industry standard. The technique cannot be operationalized: it requires that
practitioners be able to identify, and know the market price of, an alternative
technology that was nearly identical to the technology adopted but that never
came into existence because it was discarded. As an empirical matter, it is not
possible to know the price of something that did not exist.
To be concrete, the finding that the patent holders earned 3.3 percent of the
value of the average smartphone in 2016 has two (perhaps complementary)
interpretations: 1) the purchaser with the lowest willingness to pay for the
average smartphone valued those technologies in the equivalent of 3.3 percent
of the price she paid for her smartphone; 2) there were alternative inputs
available to producers. And given that a patented technology is not a physical
input, an obvious alternative for producers was to infringe the patents. The
3.3 percent therefore represents a lower bound estimate of the value of the
patented technologies to the marginal consumer.81
79. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977).
80. Id. at 489 (“We therefore hold that [for] the plaintiffs to recover treble damages
on account of § 7 violations, they must prove more than injury causally linked to
an illegal presence in the market. Plaintiffs must prove antitrust injury, which is
to say injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that
flows from that which makes defendants’ acts unlawful. The injury should reflect
the anticompetitive effect either of the violation or of anticompetitive acts made
possible by the violation.”). This statement was made in connection with charges
that Brunswick engaged in anticompetitive practices when it acquired defaulting
bowling centers, which it could have let close, thereby improving Pueblo’s profits.
Id. It is odd to consider “keeping a business afloat” as an argument in favor of
finding an antitrust injury.
81. Alexander Galetovic & Stephen H. Haber, SEP Royalties: What Theory of Value
and Distribution Should Courts Apply? (Hoover Inst. Working Grp. on Intellectual Prop., Innovation, and Prosperity at Stanford Univ., Working Paper No.
19001, 2019), https://hooverip2.org/wp-content/uploads/ip2-19001-paper.pdf
[https://perma.unl.edu/67US-QNGE].

2019]

MONOPOLIZATION MANIA

265

Galetovic and Haber rightly object to the incremental value standard on the grounds that it cannot be operationalized given its insurmountable valuation problems. But the difficulty in that standard in
fact goes deeper, including cases in which there is some perfect valuation method. Consider the following situation: here are two rival
firms, which for simplicity’s sake, each expend $20 to produce a new
technology and the two technologies are direct substitutes for each
other. One generates the value of $100 and the other $90. In a competitive market, the more successful technology will win out across the
board. But under the incremental value standard, the firm creating
the more valuable technology can only charge $10, which is the difference between its technology and the second-best technology. Two conclusions are clear. First, the successful firm cannot recover its initial
$20 investment. The continued presence of the losing firm means that
the winning firm cannot recover its full investment. Second, neither of
the two firms receive any credit for the initial $90 worth of improvements, which means that the innovators’ compensation is well below
social value of the technologies.
Other variations of this situation should receive parallel treatment
to allow recovery of the full cost of investment. Suppose that the first
firm moves the technology up from a base of $0 to $90. Since there is
no direct competitor, it gets full compensation for its investment, as it
should under any theory. If the second firm now comes in with a new
and independent technology worth $100, only by charging $100 will
the firm be able to recover its full investment. Forcing it to settle for
the $10 incremental value guarantees that it will never enter the market. The correct result always allows for full recovery of investment,
regardless of what rivals do and when they enter the market. A contrary result would produce this imperfection: one of the firms will not
enter the market, even though both can carry their weight if allowed
to charge market prices. To allow for only the incremental improvement to be compensated is a bit like marginal cost pricing for traditional utilities, where nothing is left to cover the fixed cost of the
initial investment—clearly an unsustainable strategy.82 On the other
hand, if a firm comes up with an improvement patent that adds $10 in
value to an existing technology, $10 is the correct price, which should
allow it to recover its full investment. The holder of the initial patents
continues—whether held by the initial innovator or some other firm—
to charge what they did before, because the improvement adds to the
value of the original patent, but does not replace it.

82. See Ronald H. Coase, The Marginal Cost Controversy, 13 ECONOMICA 169 (1946).
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Qualcomm Efficiency Justifications

The valuation difficulties in the FTC’s position are compounded by
its inattention to the serious impediment that its position has on
Qualcomm’s ability to enforce its patents. At best, Judge Koh gave
passing acknowledgment to the point that some rule of reason analysis was required.83 One of the constant refrains of the FTC is that the
relevant pricing should be done in “the shadow of the law”—that is,
against the background of the FRAND royalty standard. The argument here is that by imposing the “no license, no chips” policy, other
parties cannot claim the benefit of FRAND because they need to license the chips before they can use them.84 But it is quite clear that
under the FTC’s position, no party is ever under a duty to enter into a
FRAND negotiation for licensing any product. When established,
these FRAND obligations leave all handset manufacturers free, but
not required, to include Qualcomm chips in their equipment. Other
manufacturers of course produce other chipsets that utilize the technology built to these FRAND standards, and there is robust competition among rival chipset manufacturers to persuade the handset
manufacturers that their equipment is (taking quality and price into
account) superior to their rivals. In this setting, the FRAND commitment operates as the quid pro quo for inclusion of the patented technology in the FRAND standard. But it does not preclude competition
between rival suppliers in meeting that standard with different chipsets, a point that the FTC never explicitly acknowledges.
At this point, the efficiency rationale for the “no license, no chips”
policy becomes much clearer. Qualcomm wants to be paid in advance
for the chips that it sells. If it sells the chipsets to some party that has
no license, it has no ready way to obtain the cash for its products in
advance of sale. Any person who is given the right to acquire the chipsets without a license can then force Qualcomm to secure payment
through a damages action that is costly to maintain, and when successful, only results in the award of some supposed FRAND royalty
payments, an amount which is far less than the current chipset rates.
In addition, the company faces an additional risk from the patent exhaustion doctrine that could bar any lawsuit against the subsequent
taker of the patented technology.85 That rule blocks Qualcomm from
asserting any rights whatsoever against third parties that might
abuse or infringe its patents if it is duty-bound to sell to unlicensed
parties, who are the only parties against whom Qualcomm has any
83. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 17-CV-00220-LHK, 2019 WL 2206013,
at *12–13 (N.D. Cal. May 21, 2019).
84. See Federal Trade Commission’s Opposition to Qualcomm’s Motion to Dismiss,
supra note 75, at 1.
85. Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008).
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patent remedies. The FTC’s position ignores the customary and efficient licenses practices.
In all likelihood, any regime of forced transfers is likely to lead to a
degenerative cycle because, in the absence of strong patent protection,
no party has any incentive to keep its current contracts. So, the law
encourages a race to the bottom, since Qualcomm, or any other party
that makes and sells chipsets, is subject to the same process of forced
surrender of its intellectual property. A manufacturer’s only remaining option would be to seek compensation through an arduous ex post
damages action, which could take years, assuming that a revenuestarved firm is still in business. Why require any patentee to become
an unsecured creditor in an involuntary transaction? Indeed, under
the long-standing common law of conditions, a seller need not deliver
any property to a buyer if he does not receive cash or adequate security in advance.86 The point here is that there is an obvious efficiency
justification for this practice, and no one would question its application if the defendant did not have a monopoly position. But since this
arrangement—however it is classified—is judged based on a rule of
reason standard, the obvious payment risks cannot be ignored in the
relentless pursuit of a novel, if unspecified, monopolization theory.
Unfortunately, Judge Koh’s single-minded monopolization theory
never addresses the efficiency side of the equation. Under the wellestablished rule of Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp.,87 the proper way to establish an antitrust violation is to introduce evidence that “ ‘tends to exclude the possibility’ that the alleged
conspirators acted independently.”88 In Matsushita, a predatory pricing case, the courts note that there are many explanations for why
companies lower prices that do not require the existence of a conspiracy. The simplest explanation is that competition keeps prices low. It
would be exceedingly odd for multiple firms to agree to sell goods for
an amount below their production costs. None of them have a strong
chance to recoup the gains later on, given the risk of entry by other
firms once prices were raised.89 Paradoxically, predation by a single
monopolistic firm is, at the margin, more dangerous than industrywide collusion in a less concentrated market.
86. Kingston v. Preston, 2 Douglas 689, 99 Eng. Rep. 437 (K.B. 1773) (“[I]t would be
the greatest injustice if the plaintiff should prevail: the essence of the agreement
was, that the defendant should not trust to the personal security of the plaintiff,
but, before he delivered up his stock and business, should have good security for
the payment of the money. The giving such security, therefore, must necessarily
be a condition precedent.”).
87. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
88. Id. at 588.
89. Id. at 589 (citing Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (1981)).
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Yet even this modification does not alter the basic antitrust equation involving Qualcomm. The FTC’s case does not involve predation,
or as Judge Koh acknowledges, any form of cooperative behavior.90
The case only involves a single company whose pricing practices for
chipsets and technology are said to allow it to wring out a monopoly
profit. But the mechanics of the FTC’s claim are utterly opaque.
Qualcomm has to sell its technology independently of its chipsets. To
raise the price of these untied activities is in effect to impose a “tax” on
buyers who do not buy the Qualcomm chipsets, reducing the demand
for its technologies. By imposing this “tax,” Qualcomm kills its own
technology business—for no good reason. It could always capture any
monopoly rent, based on patent strength, just by raising its chip
prices. Accordingly, the basic elements of its case are not present:
there is no dominant firm and there is no exclusive dealing claim since
other firms offer their own chipset and license combinations. Under
Matsushita, the FTC produced no evidence to explain how any monopolization theory is credible, nor did Judge Koh fill the gap. Indeed, all
the available evidence tends to exclude any inference of illegal
conduct.
That justification gap is especially telling because Qualcomm has
offered its own explanation for why it has uniformly adopted its practices. This justification includes a comprehensive license that allows a
licensee to purchase not only an original 3G system, but also obtain
chips, including future upgrades—say from 3G to 4G—without acquiring a separate license. In effect, any first generation licensee can acquire long-term security that ensures it will continue to receive
upgraded products without having to worry about being held up in
renegotiation. One of the constant themes of the FTC’s claim is that
Qualcomm uses its holdup powers to extend its alleged monopolistic
position. This particular practice is strong proof in the opposite direction, and is not addressed by the FTC or Judge Koh.
In addition, the FTC and Judge Koh overstate the point that
Qualcomm engaged in other unique licensing practices.91 Even if that
point were true, it would hardly establish any antitrust violation; innovation in contractual terms is as important as price and technical
competition. But, ironically, Judge Koh concludes that Qualcomm engages in illicit licensing practices because it does not license at the
chip level, but only at the device level. And at the device level,
Qualcomm only licenses to original equipment manufacturers and
never to competitors.
There are two decisive responses to that claim. The first is a strong
efficiency explanation. These licensed devices often implicate a large
90. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 17-CV-00220-LHK, 2019 WL 2206013,
at *12 (N.D. Cal. May 21, 2019).
91. Id. at *26.
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suite of Qualcomm patents, and the uniform pricing at the device level
eliminates major transaction cost issues that would arise if each element in constantly shifting chipsets had to be separately priced for
each transaction. By the same token, there has never been any indication that licensing a chip by the larger product of which it is a part lets
Qualcomm base the prices it charges on, for example, the cost of a
commercial airline. The connection between the large finished product
and the intellectual property of the product’s component parts is too
weak for such an arrangement to make sense for either side of a transaction, which is why the market has never gravitated toward this hypothetical arrangement.
Finally, it is worth noting that the device level pricing is not
unique to Qualcomm, but is also a practice adopted by its competitors.
Presumably, this industry-wide adoption is because of the same transactional advantage. Judge Koh has a separate section in her opinion
devoted to supporting the proposition that “[o]ther SEP [l]icensors
[h]ave [i]mitated Qualcomm’s [p]ractice [b]ecause it is [l]ucrative.”92
“Following Qualcomm’s lead, other SEP licensors, such as Nokia and
Ericsson, have concluded that licensing only OEMs is more lucrative
and have thus structured their practices accordingly.”93 So much for
the view that this pricing policy is a technique to extract profits by a
dominant firm, when an entire industry is benefiting from this
approach.
It has always been a serious obstacle to any Section 2 monopolization claim to show that practices used by smaller competitors to improve their efficiency advantage are somehow off limits to larger, more
successful competitors—as if they could compete on equal terms if
they are denied the use of a common and efficient business practice.
There is no good explanation as to why successful firms have to abandon the pricing practices that paved the way to their success. Indeed,
such a restriction is an implicit subsidy to smaller players.
It turns out that the FTC eliminated any need to show the inherent
tendency of Qualcomm’s practice to create monopoly rents. After all, if
Qualcomm raised its rates as its market share increased, that would
surely count, a fortiori, as a use of monopoly power. And of course, if it
had lowered its rates, the FTC could still have insisted that such reductions were too small in dollar amount to make any serious difference. So, they would argue, Qualcomm continued—magically—to earn
monopoly profits by lowering prices just enough to maintain its dominant position.
However, the counter explanation is really quite clear. The high
rates that Qualcomm is able to charge are a function of its superior
92. Id. at *78.
93. Id.

270

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98:241

technology. The return of Apple as a customer to Qualcomm is evidence of that position. Recall that Apple had at various times before
2016 explored entering into purchase arrangements with other suppliers, but always found that Qualcomm’s competitors’ products did not
meet its own production standards. If there had been a supposed lockin effect by virtue of these contractual arrangements with Qualcomm,
Apple would never have bothered to look elsewhere for potential chips.
Nor would it have wanted, in its contracts with Qualcomm, the power
to exit the arrangements. The existence of an exit right is evidence of
the existence of a competitive market.
That point is further underscored by the odd feature of the FTC’s
lawsuit seeking injunctive relief against Qualcomm. The lawsuit is
based on information about market structure that omits any reference
whatsoever to the major events that occurred after January 2017, including the ill-fated decision by Apple to radically shift its purchasing
practices. Apple acquired 100 percent of its chips from Intel, even
though it had previously acquired 100 percent of its chips from
Qualcomm. The inconsistency here is particularly ironic given that the
FTC on the one hand claims that Qualcomm’s conduct is an “ongoing”
violation, but on the other hand resists introducing any evidence to
show the supposed anticompetitive effects.
At the time of trial, the evidence showed a declining market share
of Qualcomm’s chips from over 90% from 2008 to 2014, and dropped
down to over 80% percent in 2014, on both a unit and revenue basis.
Those numbers subsequently slipped to over 60% on a unit basis and
74% on a revenue basis for 2016 in a market replete with new entrants and new technology. Those new entrants are still there, yet
when Apple settled its suit with Qualcomm, it entered into a longterm license arrangement for its chips. At the end of the day, the intellectual blindness of both the FTC and Judge Koh proves the old adage
that “it takes a great mind to understand the obvious.” Both parties
could have spared everyone undue angst by looking at the overall situation and realizing that their sophisticated list of antitrust violations
is based on the simple reality that Qualcomm’s chips are better than
Intel’s.
IV. CONCLUSION
I have offered this detailed examination of both the FTC’s claim
and Judge Koh’s opinion because I think that the role of patent and
antitrust law is to encourage—not stifle—competition and innovation.
In general, the greatest effort should be made to reward innovators,
not implementers. Yet the FTC’s claim and Judge Koh’s opinion appear to violate the relevant norms by adopting exotic theories of antitrust. This case appears to be a throwback to an earlier era in which
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antitrust theories were used to thwart the operation of successful
businesses for the benefit of their competitors.
As noted above, there are three types of antitrust cases: per se illegality, “rule of reason,” and per se legality. In light of recent developments, it is now clear as a matter of both theory and practice that the
FTC’s complaint against Qualcomm falls into the no-duty classification, so this complaint should never have been heard. Even if that
judgment was somehow in error, the FTC’s case would fall into the
“rule of reason” category, at which point Qualcomm’s efficiency justifications for following standard, industry-wide practices seem decisive.
Yet ironically, this case ignores the tremendous dynamism that
arises when economic rewards are allocated to those who make and
facilitate change. The only successful long-term regulatory strategy
must start with the proposition that patent licensees have obligations
with respect to licensors, obligations that cannot be avoided by
wrongly insisting that a wide range of contractual provisions and contract rates generate onerous antitrust obligations. Unfortunately, this
assumption is ignored in the opinion written by Judge Koh and in the
FTC’s insistence that Qualcomm is guilty of a per se violation of the
antitrust laws. Recently, the cause of aggressive antitrust enforcement suffered defeats in both Ohio v. American Express, Co.94 and
United States v. AT&T, Inc.95 The FTC should be chastised once
again, and Judge Koh’s disastrous opinion should be consigned to the
dustbin of antitrust history. The decision of the Ninth Circuit to stay
immediate enforcement of her order is the first step in that direction.

94. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018); but see Evan Chesler & David
Korn, Lessons from Amex for Platform Antitrust Litigation, 98 NEB. L. REV. 345
(defending the district court’s outcome in Ohio v. American Express).
95. United States v. AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 2019).

